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Abstract
A Brisbane survey was conducted to examine some of the consequences 
of Centrelink breach penalties when applied to unemployment welfare 
recipients under the Howard Coalition Government’s ideology of Mutual 
Obligation. Fifty-six such recipients responded to the author’s survey 
by completing a questionnaire about their experiences after receiving 
one or more breach penalties. The consequences of being breached for 
those respondents are contrasted with the Coalition Government’s stated 
expectations for its Mutual Obligation driven breach penalty system. 
The background to the rise of Mutual Obligation as an ideology and the 
elevated incidence of breach penalties are briefly discussed, along with the 
report of the survey findings. Interestingly, two surprise findings are given 
specific focus as they offer new insight.
Mr Simon Schooneveldt 
DipAppSc(Counselling), BSocSc(HumServ), GradDipSocSc, MSocSc(HumServ). 
After 25 years of commercial corporate management, Simon developed and co-
ordinated programs for supporting people with psychiatric disabilities to gain and 
maintain open employment for the Department of Human Services and Health (Cth.). 
He is currently Vice-President of the Mental Health Association of Qld. Inc. (MHAQ) and 
has research interests in disability unemployment and social justice. He is responsible 
for the Australian Basic Income Guarantee (BIGA) website, lectures in the School of 
Humanities and Human Services at Queensland University of Technology (QUT) and is 
completing his PhD at QUT’s Centre for Social Change Research. 
s.schooneveldt@qut.edu.au
156 Australian Journal of Social Issues Vol.39 No.2 May 2004
Introduction
The large majority of people who receive breach penalties from Centrelink are 
unemployed, in receipt of welfare payments under either the New Start Allowance 
program or the Youth Allowance program. These programs include Activity Test 
conditions with which beneficiaries must comply in order to avoid incurring breach 
penalties. Central to the whole issue of breaching is the political ideology of Mutual 
Obligation (Kinnear 2000) and entrenched high levels of long-term unemployment 
(Borland 2000). 
The author describes the escalating Mutual Obligation regime implemented by the 
Howard Coalition Government and defines and quantifies breach penalties. Some 
findings from the author’s Brisbane survey are presented, evaluated and compared 
with the Howard Government’s stated expectations for its Mutual Obligation policy. 
Two unexpected findings are highlighted as they provide further new insight into 
consequences of the breaching process.
New groups of welfare recipients, such as Disability Support Pensioners and Single 
Mothers are now intended to be included in the Mutual Obligation regime, although 
the Senate currently continues to reject the Bill to include people with disability. Some 
precognition of the future situation for such people, if they do come under Mutual 
Obligation, can be glimpsed from the indications reported by the unemployed welfare 
recipients who responded to the Brisbane survey. 
Background to the ascendancy of Mutual Obligation
Central to discussion of Australia’s income support welfare system is an understanding of 
the importance of increasingly higher levels of long term unemployment (Edwards et al. 
2001) and the now entrenched political ideology of Mutual Obligation with its coercive 
breach penalty system (Hartman 2001). In 1974 the Australian rate of unemployment 
was less than 3 per cent (Watts 2001: 3). The economic upturns in the late 1980’s and late 
1990’s were not enough to restore that low unemployment level, the best achieved was 
5.4 per cent in November 1989 (Borland 2000: 1). 
In September 2003 unemployment stood officially at 5.8 per cent (ABS 2003a). 
However, when under-employed people, discouraged job-seekers and disguised 
unemployed people are taken into account, the ‘real level of unemployment’ is in the 
order of 12 to 18 per cent of the working age population (Tomlinson 2003: 1). Carlson 
and Mitchell (2002: 50) calculated that Australia ‘now wastes over 12 per cent of its 
available labour resources’. 
With high unemployment levels came a rise in the number of people who are long-term 
unemployed. Burgess et al. (1998: 3) reported the average duration of unemployment 
‘rose from three weeks in 1966…to 50.5 weeks in 1998’. The ‘one-year’ long-term 
unemployed now runs at 57 per cent of all benefit recipients (Saunders & Tsumori 
2003: 3). However, of over 600,000 people currently receiving unemployment benefits, 
Ziguras et al. (2003) reported that the numbers of long-term unemployed people who 
exceeded two years of unemployment, (rather than one year) now total almost half of 
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all unemployment beneficiaries. The Department of Family and Community Services 
confirmed the figure at 281,289 job seekers (Courier-Mail 2003). 
Increasingly, conditions of employment have fragmented away from permanent full-time 
work, which can exacerbate frustrations of unemployed people in their job search. The 
author estimates that permanent full-time jobs now total less than half of all jobs. In 
August 2003 some 9.5 million people were working, 5.4 million of whom worked ‘full 
time at 35 hours or more’, leaving 4.1 million (43 per cent) working less than full time 
(ABS 2003b). For this exercise, jobs and individuals are each treated as a unit of one. 
An ACTU (2003) survey and an Age newspaper study (Age 2003) each reported some 
800,000 casual jobs are ‘full time’. When the ABS statistic is adjusted to reflect this 
fact, 4.9 million jobs, or 51.5 per cent of all ‘jobs’ are now casualised, part-time and/or 
short-term, whilst only 48.5 percent are permanent full-time.
In the context of this fragmented job market, Minister Abbott recently conceded the 
unfairness of the interaction between the tax system and the ‘clawback’ of welfare 
benefits applied to those who obtain casual part-time employment. De-motivating 
effective tax rates of ‘nearly 70 per cent and sometimes 100 per cent’ apply (Abbott 2003: 
2-3). Essentially Abbott described the classic ‘poverty trap’. 
It should be remembered that governments, when blaming and disciplining those who 
fail to meet their obligations of finding work, effectively shift the accent away from the 
problem of a lack of employment to ‘a problem with unemployed individuals’ Lauritsen 
(2001: 13-14). This oft-used form of blaming ‘dole-bludgers’ is well understood (Watts 
2001: 5) because ‘blaming the victim allows policy makers to absolve themselves from 
responsibility’ and obviates the need to provide full employment (Hartman 2001: 3-4). 
The introduction of Mutual Obligation 
Mutual Obligation policy was introduced in 1997. Prime Minister Howard asserted that 
his Government should assist those in genuine need. He also noted ‘it is the case that 
– to the extent that it is within their capacity to do so – those in receipt of such assistance 
should give something back to society in return, and in the process improve their own 
prospects for self-reliance’ (Howard 1999: 10). 
The Coalition Government follows, according to Prime Minister Howard, ‘a mix in 
public policy which combines liberalisation in economic policy and what I would 
describe as a “modern conservatism” in social policy’ (Howard 1999, p.3). Combined 
with a belief in the efficiency of private enterprise and an acceptance of the demands of 
globalisation, this dry neo-liberal economic fundamentalist (there is nothing ‘rational’ 
about it) welfare agenda underpins perceptions that rational individuals readily respond 
to monetary incentives and disincentives (Donald 2000).
Consequently, Australia’s categorical Social Security system is now based on the 
traditional Lockean Protestant work ethic, which holds that one should not receive 
‘something for nothing’. The system increasingly seeks to coerce specified welfare 
recipients to engage in mandatory ‘activities’ under the ideology of Mutual Obligation 
(Burgess et al. 1998: 7) so that they may ‘give something back’. Such targeting of 
unemployed welfare recipients has been popularly accepted as being fair and ethical. 
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‘Giving something back’ to society would be compulsory and could include specified 
volunteer work, approved study, participation in Work for the Dole programs or prescribed 
job-search activities. Compulsory job-seeker diaries and interviews, Activity Tests and punitive 
‘breaching’ systems were implemented to coerce people to give something back. The second 
reading for the Social Security Amendment Bill, legalising the Mutual Obligation breaching 
regime, outlined the main objective ‘to maintain a strong deterrence for failure to meet 
reasonable requirements’ (Moses & Sharples 2000:4). 
However implementation has also meant that unemployed people are subjected to more 
surveillance, duties, and punitive measures than before. Unemployment payments are 
no longer a right ‘but were now made conditional upon participation in employment 
programs’ (Burgess et al. 2000: 174-186) thus making welfare no longer a right, but ‘a 
charity’ (Castles 2001: 102). 
The nature and increased incidence of breach penalties
Centrelink breach penalties are part of a compliance control strategy. The Centrelink 
Agency is authorised to temporarily withhold partial or total payment from a welfare 
recipient who is deemed by a Centrelink officer to be in breach of an Administrative or 
Activity Test requirement imposed under Mutual Obligation (DEWSRB 2001). There 
were 56 listed ‘reasons’ to impose breach penalties in 1998 (Moses & Sharples 2000: 
6) and those reasons have increased. The activity test program extends to breaches of 
requirements of the Job Network group of publicly funded, privately owned employment 
training and placement providers contracted to Centrelink (Centrelink 2001: 1). 
Activity test penalties reduce payments differentially between first and subsequent 
‘offences’. ACOSS (2001a: 3-11) pointed out that a third time activity breach represents 
a total ‘fine’ or loss of benefit of $3,384, a higher ‘punishment’ than is applied for 
many criminal offences. Expanding Mutual Obligation requirements and activity tests 
facilitated Centrelink’s issue of breach penalties to treble over recent years, peaking 
at 386,946 in 2000/2001. Although many people receive multiple breaches, this is an 
extraordinary number of breaches when compared with the total number of 722,000 
unemployment benefit recipients reported for 1999-2000 (Newman 2000: 9). 
The Sydney Welfare Rights Centre figures (cited in ACOSS 2001a: 5) combined with 
updated figures from DFACS (2002) and ACOSS (2002: 2) facilitated computation of 
this table of total breach numbers from 1997/8 through 2001/2.
Centrelink breaches from 1997/8 to 2001/2.
1997-1998 1998-1999 1999-2000 2000-2001 2001-2002
(July-June) (July-June) (July-June) (July-June) (July-June)
120,718 165,492 302,494 386, 946
260,000* 
Estimate
A spotlight on breaching policy occurred when the extraordinarily high figures for 
2000-2001 became widely known and a number of internal and external inquiries 
Do Mutual Obligation Breach Penalties Coerce Compliance with Government Expectations?
159
were instigated (ACOSS 2001a; Ombudsman 2002). Eventually this intense focus 
obliged Minister Vanstone (2002a: 1-2) to admit that breaching ‘could be too harsh on 
vulnerable people’ and breach incidences fell by over 100,000 for the 2001–2002 year, 
to around 260,000 (Vanstone 2002b). However a 100,000 reduction in the number of 
unemployment beneficiaries was also recorded for that year (FaCS 2002). 
Increasing the number of hoops through which a welfare recipient must jump results 
in disincentive, so that some people leave the system even when fully eligible to receive 
payment (Goodin 2001). Moses and Sharples (2000: 17) reported that for a ‘very 
conservative 27% [of recipients] the system just becomes too hard and that they turn 
instead to relatives, the welfare sector or crime for support’. 
Government expectations for the Mutual Obligation breaching regime
The Howard Government expected that rigorous application of compulsory activity 
test requirements would coerce active job search (Moses & Sharples 2000: 4) and ‘make 
it harder for people to choose welfare over work’ (Jackman 2002: 5). At the same time, 
under Mutual Obligation ideology, coercive practices are expected to enhance the 
chances of people finding work (Richardson 2000). 
Under a robust compliance regime, people who received a breach penalty would be 
motivated to ‘comply’ with activity tests and thus avoid further breaches at increasing 
penalty rates. At the same time the pressure would ensure that unemployed people 
would actively seek work and move ‘off-benefit’ quickly (DEWRSB 2001: 11). As the 
Commonwealth Productivity Commission put it; ‘a breaching regime is an important part 
of ensuring that unemployment beneficiaries seriously engage in job search or measures 
that improve their employability’ (CPC 2002: S6, 17). 
At a bureaucratic level, Government rhetoric also influenced Departmental and 
Centrelink staff attitudes toward the treatment of customers, particularly regarding 
diminution of fair treatment and due process for customers. Moses and Sharples (2000: 
11-12) who are Department of Family and Community Services Officers, conceded that 
‘significant rises’ in the breach rate coincided with Mutual Obligation initiatives such as 
the Job Network and the Work for the Dole program. 
Centrelink staff became more willing to impose breaches. ACOSS obtained a copy 
of Centrelink’s internal policy manual. Amongst many controversial instructions, 
appeared the succinct edict ‘job seekers must not be given the benefit of the doubt’ in 
breaching matters (ACOSS 2001a: 6-7, bolding in original). In line with its expectation 
of the deterrence effect, the Howard Government instructed Centrelink to increase 
compliance surveillance and to contractually pressure Job Network members to increase 
breach recommendations by setting target quotas for breaches (Ombudsman 2002; 
Pearce et al. 2002). 
The Government expected that recipients should accept active and compulsory job 
search as ‘normal’ and ‘useful’ components of ‘reasonable’ job-seeker responsibilities 
(Newman 2000). Minister Anthony (2000: 1) expected that complying with Mutual 
Obligation requirements would ‘leave people with a sense of pride and belonging’ and 
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heightened self-esteem. The Prime Minister expected that coercive Mutual Obligation 
would ‘improve prospects for self reliance’ for welfare recipients (Howard 1999: 6)
Further demonstrating expectations that the Mutual Obligation breaching regime would 
deter all types of people against accepting welfare, the Howard Government is extending 
Mutual Obligation to a wider range of welfare recipients. Ministers Vanstone and Abbott 
introduced a Bill extending Mutual Obligation requirements to single parents with 
school age children and all unemployed people to retirement age (Vanstone & Abbott 
2001: 4). Minister Anthony canvassed the notion that such single parents also need to 
undertake compulsory ‘parenting training’ so that generational welfare dependence may 
be avoided (Queensland Times 2002: 10). 
Minister Vanstone introduced legislation which would enable some people to lose their 
Disability Support Pension eligibility, and have their payments reduced to the New Start 
unemployment benefit level (a cut of around $26 per week) and be subjected to activity 
test breach penalties mandated under Mutual Obligation (Lawrence 2002). The Senate 
continues its refusal to pass the Bill, including subsequent amendments, at time of 
writing. 
The methodology of the survey 
The author undertook a qualitative questionnaire type survey in Brisbane, designed to 
examine the experiences of people who had been breached by Centrelink and compare 
those experiences with the stated policy expectations of the Howard Government as 
outlined above. Thirty-three questions, including four on demographics, were framed to 
elicit data about breaching experiences and outcomes for individual respondents who 
remained anonymous. Most questions were ‘tick-the-box’, but seven were open-ended, 
providing respondents the opportunity to express their own thoughts on their breach 
penalty experiences.
Questions were asked about reasons for, or the lack of explanation given when breached, 
perceived fairness, perceived pressures to leave welfare benefit programs, perceived 
pressures to search harder for work, knowledge of (and use of) systems of appeal. 
Further questions were asked as to whether notice of an impending breach was given, 
any consequent increase or decrease in self-esteem, any improvement in job prospects 
and was there greater or lesser future intention to comply with Centrelink requirements? 
A final question asked if accommodation was changed as a consequence of having 
received a breach penalty, was it equally desirable, less desirable or ‘other’?
The use of one standard survey form, collected from three separate locations, does assist 
reliability and validity (Hammersley 1992). Data collection took place during 6 days in 
April 2002. The author took up a position on the public footpath directly in front of 
three Centrelink branch offices at Mitchelton, Chermside and Nundah, located in the 
northern areas of urban Brisbane. Members of the public in the vicinity of these branches 
could see a large (size A1) sign either side of the author’s small table. The signs invited 
participation in the survey for people who had been breached and were over 18 years old.
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Because the author met the survey respondents, liased with various authorities and 
conducted correspondence, meetings and discussions with a variety of Centrelink 
Managers to facilitate the survey, it is appropriate that this additional ‘field data’ was also 
included to broaden the study insights (Babbie 1995: 280). For example, some comments 
made by various Centrelink managers exhibited attitudinal thinking reflective of the 
ideological rhetoric used by the Howard Government discussed earlier. 
At Mitchelton, it was apparent to the author that Centrelink staff had not been alerted 
about the survey activity because staff exhibited obvious interest, curiosity and concern. 
A supervisor challenged the researcher with the comment that ‘no one else was game 
to approach you’. Accepting a copy of the survey instrument and various supporting 
documents, the supervisor advised that the Commonwealth had ‘move on’ powers, 
however a senior manager from Central Office was presently ‘coming out’ to assess the 
situation. 
The Brisbane Area Business Manager duly arrived, having been briefed by the supervisor. 
Interestingly, she stated that her initial advice indicated there was protest activity 
involving placards taking place. She expressed surprise that upon arrival, she could only 
see ‘one individual, standing at a small table under a tree, like at those polling booths’. 
Her major concerns were that there should be no placards, protests or press gatherings.
Similar concerns exhibited by other Centrelink personnel in communications with the 
author suggested that an elevated level of awareness and understanding does exist about 
the controversial nature of Mutual Obligation breaching policies. Concern was often 
expressed that public protest activity could readily erupt, creating ‘political problems’ for 
Centrelink. 
One manager expressed concern about what form the survey might take, explaining ‘this 
Centrelink office is one of multiple tenancies in this complex, and a very unpopular one, 
because of the nature of our customers, as you would understand’. That ‘nature’ was 
understood by the author to mean unpleasant, poorly behaved deviant people of low 
social acceptability and standing. 
The Nundah Branch Manager confirmed awareness of the survey, explaining that 
Canberra and Queensland management had directed that this survey could proceed, 
provided compliance with Centrelink’s national guidelines for the management of 
‘customer behavior’ were maintained. Tellingly, she had been told that this author was 
‘benign and friendly’! 
Some limitations of the research 
It needs to be recognised that some weaknesses of the survey approach used include the 
fact that the emphasis of the survey is on individuals who have been breached, and there 
is no control or comparison group of unemployed people who have not been breached. 
Thus the information cannot be generalised for use in a broader context. However some 
conclusions can be drawn about the experiences of the surveyed group.
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Findings of this survey on Government expectations relative to Mutual 
Obligation policy 
From the 56 people who completed the survey, some response figures stood out:
• 95% of respondents (53 people) thought that, when they were breached, Centrelink 
was being unfair to them.
• 93% of respondents (52 people) felt their self-esteem had decreased after being 
breached. Many felt that Centrelink had put pressure on them to go ‘off-benefit’ 
permanently.
• 91% of respondents (51 people) did not realise beforehand, that they were about to 
be breached. This suggested Centrelink exhibited a lack of concern about customer 
rights, due process and procedural fairness. The Ombudsman’s inquiry drew a similar 
conclusion a year earlier (McLeod 2001). 
• 73% of respondents (41 people) believed that they were not more likely to get paid 
work because of any Centrelink compulsory activity undertaken, which suggests the 
requirements were viewed as unrealistic and unreasonable.
• 62% of respondents (35 people) indicated getting a breach penalty was of no help to 
them in avoiding further breach penalties. A majority 56%, (31 people) reported more 
than one breach. 14%, (8 people) reported receiving three or more breaches. This 
accords with the literature (ACOSS 2001b).
• 57% of respondents (32 people) felt they could not look any harder for work than 
they already were.
• 41% of respondents (23 people) indicated that, once breached, they needed to obtain 
assistance from family, another 15 people were helped by charities and 7 people 
indicated that their church was of help. Increasing rates of charity support need are in 
line with the literature (Horan 2001; Nevile 2001: 30). 
• 21% of respondents (12 people) needed to move into less desirable accommodation.
Two ‘stand-out’ unexpected findings
Whilst the all of the findings of this survey have some importance for our understanding 
of the consequences of people receiving breach penalties, two specific findings stand out 
as surprising, and of concern.
Firstly, getting breached once does not work as an incentive, as the Government 
expected, to ensure compliance with compulsory administrative and activity 
requirements in order to avoid further breaches. More than half of the survey 
respondents received more than one breach penalty, with several reporting multiple 
breaches.
Secondly, if one does get breached, there is a significant risk that, as a consequence, there 
will be a need for that individual to move into less desirable accommodation than was 
previously enjoyed. This is a very important finding because it indicates that a serious 
consequence of being breached is that people’s accommodation standards could be 
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reduced, which was noted in the literature (ACOSS 2000: 2; 2001b; Nevile 2001), but 
could not be an ethical outcome. However in this survey, 12 people out of 56 (almost 
22%) reported needing to move into less desirable accommodation, an unexpectedly 
high proportion. Three respondents wrote ‘on the streets’ and another reported moving 
to a ‘men’s homeless shelter’. 
Although almost one quarter of all respondents had housing difficulty, at the Nundah 
location, respondents appeared to be breached more often, with higher penalty costs, 
and almost half needed to move to less desirable accommodation after being breached. 
Nundah is reportedly a less affluent, relatively lower socio-economic area compared with 
the other two locations (Wilson 2002). It appears that the most vulnerable low-income 
individuals in the poorest area were driven into lower-standard housing. Whether an 
expected consequence or otherwise, Government is aware that many people who are 
breached become homeless, as reported by the National Welfare Rights Network 
(2002:6). 
Breaching causes real hardship for some people
This survey found that people who were breached did have their lives seriously affected 
negatively. Mandatory activity test requirements under Mutual Obligation policy did 
lead to people being readily breached, consequently experiencing financial hardship 
and frustration, feelings of decreased self-esteem with strong resentments about being 
unfairly treated, which raises the question of ethics. 
Kinnear (2000: V-VI) examined the ethical foundations of the Howard Government’s 
Mutual Obligation policies and found them unable to stand up to scrutiny. Citing Rawls’ 
argument that Government programs must be just, and individuals must have freely 
accepted the benefits, she found those two conditionalities not met, and concluded 
that Mutual Obligation policies failed ethically and morally, especially because the 
socially advantaged impose obligation as a form of repayment, upon the financially 
disadvantaged. 
Goodin (2001: 191) noted that same lack of choice about receiving welfare, arguing 
that obliging people to sign contractual activity agreements in return for welfare 
benefits lacked moral force. The notion ‘agree or starve’ (by losing benefit payment) was 
analogous to the highway robber’s demand ‘your money or your life!’ 
Conclusion
As noted earlier, the findings of this survey cannot be applied to outcomes for all people 
who have been breached or unemployed people who have not been breached, yet the 
findings are largely consistent with the literature. However it is evident that the Howard 
Government’s coercive Mutual Obligation breaching practices have not deterred more 
than half of the people surveyed in this Brisbane survey from being breached more than 
once. The breach penalty regime was designed in part to pressure people off welfare. 
The unemployed people surveyed could not be pressured off welfare, because they had 
no option other than to continue to claim welfare benefits. Both outcomes are contrary 
to Government expectation. 
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Of greatest concern was the larger than expected proportion of people who 
were breached, even for a first time, who then needed to move into less desirable 
accommodation, with four people reporting homelessness. This accommodation 
outcome confirms a need for further research into this area and provides evidence that 
breaching practices implemented under Mutual Obligation strike at the most vulnerable, 
least advantaged citizens. 
The plight of the unemployed people identified in the survey presents a different picture 
of their life circumstances than that which Government rhetoric seeks to conjure. Prime 
Minister Howard boastfully proclaims the effectiveness of the Government’s safety net, 
generously provided to ‘protect’ people who are ‘genuinely in need’ and deserving of 
welfare support (1999: 4). 
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